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 Executive Summary2  
Investment in UK regulated networks is already substantial. Investment by energy 
networks has been running at circa £10bn pa, for example, and the regulated water industry at 
around £5bn pa. However, looking forward, it is widely expected that these figures will need 
to increase substantially. Climate change alone will have a significant impact. The Committee 
on Climate Change has suggested that investment in energy will need to double in order to 
meet a target of net zero by 2050, and the water industry will need to increase investment 
substantially to improve resilience. Away from climate change, there are also other drivers of 
significant infrastructure requirements.  For example, the Government’s Future Telecoms 
Infrastructure Review estimated that an investment of £30bn will be needed just to roll out a 
full fibre broadband network in the UK.  
However, at the very time that the need for greater investment is emerging, there has 
also been growing concern around the regulation of the sectors that are expected to deliver 
much of the additional investment. At the heart of these concerns lies the idea that the regulated 
companies have been too profitable and that a shift in the regulation/provider relationship may 
be needed. Calls for voluntary returns, a ‘painshare and gainshare’ relationship between 
 
1 ‘This paper was commissioned by the NIC, to inform their analysis on cost of capital issues in the regulated 
sectors. The NIC approached Professors Grout and Zalewska given the research that they have published on the 
impact of regulatory change on the cost of capital. The NIC asked Professors Grout and Zalewska to write a 
briefing paper on the implications of their research (and any additional research they wished to undertake) on the 
question of what the empirical evidence says about how changes in regulation may impact on the cost of equity 
and the cost of capital, and the relative scale of any such effects compared to other factors that impact on the cost 
of equity and cost of capital of the utility companies.’ (NIC, October 2019)  
2 The briefing note has been prepared by Professors Grout and Zalewska acting in a personal capacity. The views 
expressed in this note should not be interpreted as expressing views of any body which Professor Grout and 
Professor Zalewska are connected to.  
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regulated companies and consumers, far more emphasis on helping vulnerable customers and 
meeting climate change targets, and other suggestions requiring a more adaptive form of 
regulation have emerged in the last few years. The Labour Party have even suggested 
nationalising some of the regulated companies.  
Alongside these calls for change, there are already structural reasons to think that in the 
longer run regulation may have to become more adaptive in the future. For example, in the 
growing ‘tech’ world, with uncertain and ever more changing environments, companies cannot 
expect that the regulatory backdrop to their investments will remain static while the world, 
technologies and markets change rapidly. In the longer run, regulation may have to change 
more frequently (e.g. greater use of conditional review clauses, mid-term reopeners, etc.). A 
world of more ‘adaptive regulation’ may become the norm and, whilst regulators should be 
expected to stick to core principles, it may not be beneficial to stick to fixed, narrow rules for 
long periods.   
There are voices suggesting that these two directions of travel (greater investment and 
more adaptive regulation) are incompatible. Namely, changing regulation, increasing 
regulatory flexibility, use of conditional review clauses and raising further requirements on 
regulators (and hence regulated companies) will increase the cost of capital just at the time 
when more investment is needed, making it harder for companies to invest in the necessary 
infrastructure. This briefing note addresses this question. 
It looks at empirical evidence on the relative cost of equity capital of regulated 
companies during four periods. Specifically, it examines:  
(i) changes in the cost of equity of the utility sector relative to the cost of equity of 
similar, but unregulated, companies during the early years of the New Labour 
government of 1997;  
(ii) changes in the relative cost of equity of energy and water companies during the 
period that the RIIO model of regulation was introduced in the energy industry;  
(iii) differences in the cost of equity between retail and network energy companies 
during the period when the Default Energy Tariff was mooted and introduced, 
and 
(iv) post financial crisis changes in the cost of equity of regulated sectors relative to 
industry sectors across the G13 countries.  
Clear messages appear from investigating these case studies. In general, (i) the 
regulatory changes we examine appear to have a limited effect on the difference between the 
cost of equity of the companies that were the subject of the regulatory changes and those that 
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were not, and (ii) that changes in the difference between cost of equity of the companies that 
were the subject of the regulatory changes and those that were not are small relative to other 
changes in the cost of equity which are common to both sets of companies. The cost of capital 
depends on the relative weight of the cost of equity and the cost of debt, so it depends on the 
relative weight of debt to equity. Taking this into account, we also suggest that the limited 
effect on cost of equity also carries over to the cost of capital.  
That is, the evidence suggests that the cost of capital of the regulated companies does 
indeed change over time but the difference between the cost of capital of the different sectors 
remains surprisingly stable even though some of the regulated sectors are facing significant 
regulatory change (e.g. the introduction of RIIO, the introduction of the Default Tariff Cap for 
energy supply) whilst others are not.    
The evidence does not suggest that the implementation of, and uncertainty around, more 
adaptive regulatory policies, such as more explicit profit sharing, utility companies explicitly 
putting more emphasis on the their public interest in their day to day decisions, or more 
generally, there being more of a social contract between utility companies and their customers 
(including perhaps greater emphasis on helping vulnerable customers, awareness of ESG, and 
such like), will (other broader factors remaining constant) necessarily increase the cost of 
capital of these companies. Indeed, there are sound reasons to suggest that it may often reduce 
the cost of capital of the utilities facing such regulatory changes, since any potential increase 
in the cost of capital is likely to be offset by a decline that arises from a decline in overall 
volatility of return.  
We wish to emphasise, however, caveats that should be noted.  
Although there was uncertainty around the specific changes in regulation in the case-
studies we consider, the direction of ‘regulatory’ travel was clear, i.e. the precise form of the 
regulation was not obvious, but where it was heading was. This makes it easier for companies 
to plan and may well be an important factor in mitigating against increases in the market risk 
arising from the changes. The implication is that it is important for regulators to adhere to 
longer-lived specific principles. If regulators have specific principles which give firms 
confidence in judging how a regulator is likely to respond to unforeseen events, adaptive 
regulation can bring benefits without bringing costs.  
Second, it is important to remember that a lower cost of capital is not necessarily an 
end in itself. If a company has been given too high a cost of capital in a price review, then 
reducing this to a more appropriate rate is an obvious benefit for consumers. But if a cost of 
capital is reduced because the regulator has taken risks away from the company that could 
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sensibly be managed by the company, then the aggregate effect depends on the balance between 
the benefit of the lower cost of capital against any impact arising from the dampening of the 
company’s incentives to reduce cost. The picture is similarly nuanced with indexing. Indexing 
as much as is possible may reduce the cost of capital and the potential for abnormal returns of 
regulated companies, but, in some cases, this may imply a reduced risk for companies and an 
increased risk for consumers, which may well indicate a degree of loss for consumers. The 
welfare impact is the balance of the two forces.   
The caveats mentioned above emphasise how retrospective judgements can be 
presented as obvious errors, but which were at the time far more nuanced. Having said that, it 
is difficult to argue with the general thrust of the recent report by Citizens Advice which 
suggests that regulators have historically been conservative and overly concerned to avoid 
shortfalls in investment, and hence set the allowed regulated prices to be higher than were 
necessary3.   
  
 
3 Citizens Advice ‘Monopoly Money: How consumers overpaid by billions’, 2019. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Investment in UK regulated networks is already substantial. Investment by energy 
networks has been running at circa £10bn pa, for example, and the regulated water industry at 
around £5bn pa. However, looking forward, it is widely expected that these figures will need 
to increase substantially. Climate change alone will have a significant impact. The Committee 
on Climate Change has suggested that investment in energy will need to double in order to 
meet a target of net zero by 2050, and the water industry will need to increase investment 
substantially to improve resilience. Away from climate change, there are also other drivers of 
significant infrastructure requirements.  For example, the Government’s Future Telecoms 
Infrastructure Review estimated that an investment of £30bn will be needed just to roll out a 
full fibre broadband network in the UK.  
However, at the very time that the need for greater investment is emerging, there has 
also been growing concern around the regulation of the sectors that are expected to deliver 
much of the additional investment. At the heart of these concerns lies the idea that the regulated 
companies have been too profitable and that a shift in the regulation/provider relationship may 
be needed. Calls for voluntary returns, a government review, a ‘painshare and gainshare’ 
relationship between regulated companies and consumers, far more emphasis on helping 
vulnerable customers and other suggestions requiring a more adaptive form of regulation have 
emerged in the last few years. The Labour Party have even suggested nationalising some of the 
regulated companies.  
Alongside these calls for change, there are already structural reasons to think that 
regulation may have to become more adaptive in the future. For example, in the growing ‘tech’ 
world, with uncertain and ever more changing environments, companies cannot expect that the 
regulatory backdrop to their investments will remain static while the world, technologies and 
markets change rapidly. In the longer run, regulation may have to change more frequently (e.g., 
greater use of conditional review clauses, mid-term reopeners, etc.). A world of more ‘adaptive 
regulation’ may become the norm and, whilst regulators should be expected to stick to core 
principles, it may not be beneficial to stick to fixed, narrow rules for long periods.   
There are voices suggesting that these two directions of travel (greater investment and 
more adaptive regulation) are incompatible. Namely, changing regulation, increasing 
regulatory flexibility, use of conditional review clauses and raising further requirements on 
regulated companies, such as helping vulnerable customers, will increase the cost of capital 
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just at the time when more investment is needed, making it harder for companies to invest in 
the necessary infrastructure. 
This briefing note addresses this question.  
 
 
2. Models of utility regulation 
 
Although there are many models of regulation, price cap (incentive) regulation and rate 
of return regulation have been the most prominently used throughout the world over the last 
hundred years. 
The primary feature of the price cap regulatory model is that the future path of a utility’s 
prices is set for a fixed period, typically five years, at a level such that the expected return of 
an efficient company making reasonable efficiency improvements over the period would be 
equal to its cost of capital. At the end of the period, efficient costs are reassessed, and new 
prices set for another period. The core justification is that the utility is incentivised to reduce 
delivery costs since the company retains the full benefit of cost reduction during the period up 
to renewal of the price cap. While this has strong incentive properties, an obvious disadvantage 
is that there is also a strong incentive to fool the regulator into believing that potential efficiency 
gains are much lower than they really are. This does not reduce the incentives to reduce costs 
but can deliver returns to the utility that are above the cost of capital, or to put it another way, 
the utility may end up keeping a larger share of the gains than would be ‘ideal’ because of 
asymmetry of information between the regulator and the utility.  Similarly, there are incentives 
to shave on the quality of services, if possible, since there is no offsetting price effect. This 
type of regulation has been the dominant model for UK regulation post privatisation.     
In contrast, rate of return regulation fixes an allowed return for a utility. This ensures 
the utility does not earn undue profit but provides little in the way of incentive to increase 
efficiency and reduce costs since there is limited gain arising from reducing delivery costs. 
Since the utility’s return only increases when the size of the regulated asset base increases, 
companies have an incentive to gold-plate the system by engaging in unnecessarily high quality 
and expensive assets. This model was the main model used in the US for the second half of the 
twentieth century but has been slowly replaced by price cap regulation. 
Combinations of these two models have been discussed but are not frequently 
implemented.  For example, in the period running up to, and for a period after, the 1997 
election, the Labour Party talked of introducing an explicit sharing factor for all utilities so that 
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deviations from the target return would be explicitly shared between customers and the utility. 
In the end the Labour Party did not follow the policy but did implement a windfall tax to 
clawback historical abnormal returns. The impact on the risk of UK utilities is analysed in 
Grout and Zalewska (2006) and is discussed in some detail below. An informal equivalent to 
this form of sharing was suggested by the CEO of Ofwat in 2017, ‘painshare and gainshare’, 
where companies voluntarily moderate their returns when they are fortunate beneficiaries of 
higher returns driven by events outside their control in exchange for a quid-pro-quo when 
events they cannot control lead to unexpected lower returns. 
Probably the biggest change in the regulatory model since privatisation has taken place 
in energy network regulation, where the so called RIIO model has been adopted. RIIO is an 
acronym for Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Output, indicating the core feature of the 
regime, namely that revenue is earned through achieving various targets for outputs and being 
innovative. This is shift away from cost cutting towards incentivising specific outputs and 
innovation investment. Another unusual feature is that the RIIO price control was set for eight 
years in the first series of price controls (RIIO-1, covering electricity distribution networks, gas 
distribution networks and gas and electricity transmission networks).  With the benefit of 
hindsight, this has been deemed too long and the next set of RIIO price controls, RIIO-2 
(currently being developed) propose a more conventional time horizon. Finally, the RIIO 
process also included a significant number of sharing factors where gains from delivering better 
than expected outputs are shared with customers. Below we look at the relative risk of energy 
network companies and water companies from 2005 to 2019. This covers the period when the 
RIIO approach was developed, RIIO-1 was implemented and when the proposed changes to 
RII0-2 were announced.  
 
 
3. Measuring market risk, the cost of equity and the cost of capital 
 
Utility regulators in the UK have consistently used the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) to calculate the cost of equity (although other approaches, such as dividend growth 
models and market value to asset base, are used as cross checks). The CAPM indicates that the 
cost of equity of company i, ri, is a sum of the risk-free rate of return, rrisk-free, i.e. return investors 
can expect if they do not take any risk, and of the company specific fraction (known as ‘ beta’, 
) of the market risk premium. The market risk premium is defined as the expected difference 
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between the return earned by the market and the risk-free rate of return, rmarket – rrisk-free. More 
formally, the cost of equity of company i can be expressed by as: 
 
ri = rrisk-free  +  (rmarket – rrisk-free)  
 
The difficulty in estimating the cost of equity arises from uncertainty around the market 
risk premium (opinions can differ from 1% to as high as 9%), the market risk of the company 
(i.e. the beta) and the value of the risk-free rate. Hence, companies and regulators end up 
spending large amounts of their time (and large amounts on consultancy fees) disagreeing as 
to what the relevant number is. However, the market risk premium and the risk-free rate is the 
same across all companies. Hence, although participants can disagree enormously on their view 
of the appropriate level of the cost of equity of a company, it is far easier to agree on changes 
in the relative cost of equity between companies since this almost entirely comes down to 
relative changes in the market risk (i.e. beta) of the companies being compared. This is one of 
the benefits of looking at relative market risk that we exploit in the paper. If we are looking at 
the impact of a change in regulation on specific utilities compared to those that did not face a 
regulatory change, then we need only address the relative difference in betas (i.e. the relative 
difference in market risk).    
Assuming that capital is financed by debt and equity, the (weighted average) cost of 
capital (WACC) is the weighted average of the cost of equity and of the cost of debt. Formally, 
for any company  
WACC =  
E
E+D
rE +
D
E+D
rD, 
 
where rE and rD denote the cost of equity and the cost of debt respectively, E and D denote the 
market value of equity and the market value of debt respectively.4  
Utility companies can have very different debt/equity ratios but tend to have similar 
costs of raising debt at any given time (since the market risk of debt is quite small (typically 
close to zero)).5 Although the cost of debt is also lower than the cost of equity, this does not 
imply that reducing equity in favour of debt will reduce the cost of capital. This is because the 
 
4 A technical point surrounds how taxation affects the cost of debt relative to equity. This depends on what is 
believed about the equilibrium of the financial system (e.g. Modigliani-Miller, Miller or other types of 
equilibrium) and the nature of the tax system (notably classical or imputation). We do not delve into these issues 
since these differences are common to the market and so do not affect relativities between companies, which is 
our primary concern.     
5 Of course, at any time companies may pay very different historical debt rates, since they will have raised debt 
at different times. 
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change will make the remaining equity riskier (since the smaller equity base must bear the risk 
of the larger fixed debt obligations that have to be met). The greater market risk increases the 
cost of equity, hence mitigating any benefit that arises by having a larger proportion of the 
company’s capital consisting of the relatively cheaper debt. Indeed, the Modigliani-Miller 
Theorem suggests that a decision by a firm to increase its debt-equity ratio (assuming that the 
overall business environment remains the same) will raise the market risk of equity exactly 
enough to offset the benefit of having more of the cheaper debt finance and less of the 
expensive equity finance, so the cost of capital does not change.  
Of course, if regulators change regulations, then the regulator is potentially changing 
the business conditions under which a company is operating. Consequently, it is possible that 
the cost of equity and/or the cost of capital of a company will change.  A major problem is to 
identify whether the changes in cost of equity/capital arise because of the change in regulation 
or are due to other factors.  
This suggests a second benefit that arises from focusing on relative rather than absolute 
changes (i.e. comparing changes for a company where regulations have changed, say company 
A, relative to another company, say company B, that has not faced a regulatory change).  For 
example, if the relative market risk of company A and company B remains roughly constant 
when regulations change for company A, then the cost of capital of company A is only likely 
to increase relative to that of company B if the debt equity ratio of company A relative to B’s 
increases as a result of the regulatory change. We can also infer that if the regulatory change is 
expected to decrease the share price of company A, then A’s relative cost of capital is unlikely 
to increase unless there is a significant increase in the market risk of company A relative to 
company B.  
The above suggests that assessing the empirical evidence of the relative changes in 
market risk, and hence relative change in cost of equity, around changes in regulation is central 
to understanding how likely it is that changes in regulation have increased the relative cost of 
capital and the relative cost of equity.6 To this end, we look at empirical evidence on the relative 
cost of equity capital of regulated companies during four periods. Specifically, we examine:  
 
6 In this regard it is also worth noting Antoniou and Pescetto (1997), who look at the effect of regulatory 
announcements on the cost of equity of British Telecom. The find many announcements are associated with a 
change in market risk but conclude ‘many individual announcements are significant, but they affect beta in 
opposite directions and thus no prediction can be made on the sign of their aggregated impact’. The failure to find 
any systematic effect emphasises the importance of focussing on relative changes to help identify which effects 
can be purely attributable to regulation.  
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(i) changes in the cost of equity of the utility sector relative to the cost of equity of 
similar, but unregulated, companies during the early years of the New Labour 
government of 1997;  
(ii) changes in the relative cost of equity of energy and water companies during the 
period that the RIIO model of regulation was introduced in the energy industry; 
(iii) differences in cost of equity between retail and network energy companies 
during the period when the Default Energy Tariff was mooted and introduced, 
and 
(iv) post financial crisis changes in the cost of equity of regulated sectors relative to 
industry sectors across the G13 countries. 
 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
 
4.1 International comparisons of rate of return and price cap regulation 
Formal theoretical analysis and basic intuition both indicate that rate of return 
regulation should be a lower market risk form of regulation than price cap regulation.  
There have been several studies addressing the differences in the market risk of 
companies facing rate of return regulation to those facing price cap regulation. There are two 
caveats one should note when interpreting this literature. First, these studies tend to use data 
from the 1980s and early 1990s. This is to a large degree because of the shift away from rate 
of return regulation towards the end of the century. Second, rate of return was favoured in the 
US whilst price cap regulation was the dominant form of regulation chosen in the UK to apply 
to post-privatisation utilities, which was then exported as the privatisation wave spread 
throughout the world. Consequently, the studies tend to compare the market risk of rate of 
return regulation in one country with the market risk of price cap regulation in another. So, one 
needs to be cautious in attributing all the difference in market risk to differences in regulation 
since some of this may be attributable to country effects. Despite these caveats the evidence 
points, fairly conclusively, to a lower level of market risk with rate of return regulation than 
price cap (see for example, Alexander, Mayer and Weeds (1996) and Alexander and Irwin 
(1997)).   
Before moving on, it is worth emphasising at this juncture that the research above is 
looking at the market risk faced by the utility, and that if market risk is not sitting with the 
utility then, unless the degree of market risk has been transformed by regulation, it must be 
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sitting somewhere else. The most likely place is with the consumer. Hence, lower utility market 
risk and lower cost of capital for a utility do not automatically imply a better outcome for 
society. We have already noted that higher incentive structures tend to go hand in hand with 
higher market risk and greater incentives to reduce delivery cost but, even if incentives have 
no impact on cost choices, one may still want higher market risk for utilities if this creates a 
sufficient offsetting reduction in risk faced by the consumer. We return to this point later in the 
note. 
 
4.2 The impact of potential changes in regulation  
Understanding the impact of potential regulatory changes (and political uncertainty) on 
market risk is of considerable relevance given the current climate surrounding regulation and 
infrastructure in the UK.  Here we analyse several episodes which may help to inform the 
debate.  
 
4.2.1 The New Labour profit sharing proposals and the windfall tax 
An interesting period that throws insight into these questions is the period around the 
New Labour election victory of 1997 (here we look at mid-1993 through to the end 2000). 
During this period New Labour announced the possibility of a windfall tax in their manifesto 
and implemented one when in power. In addition, for a significant period after the election 
victory, there was consideration by the Party of introducing a profit-sharing form of regulation 
for utilities whereby deviations from the target return set in the price cap would be explicitly 
shared between customers and the utility. This latter proposed policy was never implemented 
and was finally put to bed about two years after the election. Grout and Zalewska (2006) give 
a detailed analysis of the data from this episode and discussion of the policy. The results 
provided here are based on that research.  
The empirical approach is roughly as follows.7 We constructed a sample consisting of 
the UK regulated companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and a control sample 
of ‘old-economy’ companies also quoted on the LSE.  Using a technique called Kalman Filter, 
using daily returns, we produced an estimate of the market risk for the two samples for every 
single day. This provided thousands of values of beta over the period. These are plotted in 
 
7 This is an intuitive summary of the approach and the results. See Grout and Zalewska (2006) for formal 
presentation and discussion of the empirical approach.  
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Figure 1. In addition, we tested for statistically significant changes in the market risk over time 
and assessed how these related to the policy changes being discussed (see Table 1 below).    
We applied the Kalman Filter separately to three different subperiods: (i) the period 
before the policy uncertainty about the change in the form of utility regulation, (ii) the period 
between the date when the political discussion started (taken as two months after the election 
when the debate on utility regulation opened with a formal consultation document) and when 
it was finally dropped, and (iii) the period after the idea of the regulatory change was 
abandoned.  
 
 
Figure 1. 
Kalman Filter estimated time-path of daily betas (market risk) for the portfolio of the regulated utility companies 
(regulated) and for the portfolio of ‘old economy stocks’ (control). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, consider the control sample, the darker, thin (blue) line.  Note, the three separate 
sections plotted on the diagram join up almost exactly. Indeed, the lack of match can be barely 
seen in Figure 1. Let us focus on the right break point. The estimate of the beta for the first day 
of the third period is drawn purely from the data throughout that period (i.e. using no 
information at all from the period running up to that day) and the beta for the final day of the 
middle period is drawn entirely from the data in the middle period (i.e. using no information at 
all from the period following that day). Despite this deliberate process of ignoring much of the 
adjacent, and hence very relevant data, the two lines join almost perfectly showing that there 
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is no fundamental difference in the control sample around the transfer from one period to 
another. Furthermore, there is no statistical difference between the middle period’s and the first 
period’s estimates of the market risk (shown in Grout and Zalewska, 2006). 
Turning to the sample of the utility companies (the thicker, lighter (pink) line) and 
applying a similar methodology, we see a very different position. Here, there is a clear drop in 
the line at the start of the period of policy uncertainty and a clear jump up when the period of 
policy uncertainty ended. The difference between the market risk of the utility companies and 
the control sample is far greater (utilities much lower in this period) than when there was no 
policy uncertainty. So, the data is telling us that the regulatory uncertainty had a very clear 
effect on the market risk of the utilities. However, despite the common view that regulatory 
and political uncertainty increases market risk, the data shows very clearly that in this case the 
market risk reduced, rather than increased (relative to the control sample), in the period.  
This is confirmed in Table 1 which looks, on an individual company basis, at the 
changes in the market risk relative to the old economy sample during the period of policy 
uncertainty. The final column shows the difference between the market risk of the control 
sample and the company during the period of policy uncertainty. Table 1 shows that the market 
risk of every utility company declined relative to the control sample. Only two of these drops 
were not statistically significant (one being BT, which was impacted very differently by the 
dot-com bubble than all other companies (see below)).   
 
Table 1. 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the CAPM model with GARCH(1,1) specification of the standard errors. The 
‘97-97’ subscript indicates the change of the intercept () and of the slope ( i.e. market risk) over the period 1 
July 1997 - 12 August 1999.  The dependent variables are defined as the difference between returns on 
individual company (indicated by its name) and the return on the control portfolio of the old economy stocks. 
Regressions are based on daily observations covering the May 1, 1993-December 31, 2000 period.  
   97-99    97-99 
Anglian Water 0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.238*** 
(0.054) 
 -0.386*** 
(0.070) BAA 0.0  
(0.000) 
 0.0 0 
(0.001) 
 - . 29
(0.042) 
 - .148** 
(0.067) BT - . 01* 
(0.000) 
 0.0 2*** 
(0.001) 
 0.233*** 
(0.049) 
 - . 75
(0.085) Hyder 0.0  
(0.000) 
 0.0 0 
(0.001) 
 - .465*** 
(0.047) 
 - .286*** 
(0.060) Kelda 0.0  
(0.000) 
 0.0 0 
(0.001) 
 - .323*** 
(0.058) 
 - .385*** 
(0.077) National Grid Company 0.0  
(0.000) 
 0.0  
(0.001) 
 0.084 
(0.070) 
 - .340*** 
(0.085) Pennon - . 01*** 
(0.000) 
 0.0 *** 
(0.000) 
 - .639*** 
(0.031) 
 - . 52
(0.049) Scottish Power 0.0  
(0.000) 
 0.0 1 
(0.001) 
 0.008 
(0.054) 
 - .334*** 
(0.084) Scottish & Southern 
Energy 
0.0  
(0.000) 
 0.0  
(0.001) 
 - .219*** 
(0.051) 
 - .417*** 
(0.067) Severn Trent 0.0  
(0.000) 
 0.0 0 
(0.001) 
 - .146*** 
(0.057) 
 - .393*** 
(0.078) Thames Water 0.0  
(0.000) 
 0.0  
(0.001) 
 - .186*** 
(0.048) 
 - .144** 
(0.058) United Utilities 0.0  
(0.000) 
 0.0 0 
(0.001) 
 0.024 
(0.058) 
 - .455*** 
(0.075) Viridian 0.0   0.0   - .360***  - .365*** 
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During this period there was also a windfall tax implemented on the UK utility sector. 
This was founded on the incoming government’s opinion that the utilities had earned a 
significant element of ‘undue’ profitability arising from the privatisation and regulatory regime 
at the time. In this view, the windfall tax and the proposed change in the regime to include a 
sharing factor going forward were part of a single package of reform.  
The windfall tax proposal was in the Labour Party manifesto and had been discussed in 
the period running up to the election. The tax was indeed implemented (spread across two 
dates, December 1997 and December 1998). Thus, in terms of Figure 1, the discussion around 
the windfall tax arose in the months at the end of period 1, and the actual parliamentary 
discussion and decision to implement it occurred in the last two months of the first period and 
the opening few months of the middle period.  There is no evidence in Figure 1 that this led to 
any increase in the market risk of the utilities. Indeed, it might appear that the market risk was 
slightly drifting down in that period, but such changes are so small that they are not statistically 
significant. So, the conclusion from this data would be that the windfall tax had no discernible 
effect on the market risk of the utilities.  
What is going on?  
The answer given in Grout and Zalewska (2006), and the one that most economists 
seem to have agreed with post-publication, is that the outcome is exactly what economic theory 
and finance theory would predict.8 A sharing regime can be viewed as a mix of price cap 
regulation and rate of return. Price cap regulation is at one extreme, with no sharing, and rate 
of return regulation is at the other extreme, i.e. everything is clawed back to ensure constant 
rate of return for the utility. Hence, at the time of political and regulatory uncertainty, when 
someone bought a share in one of the utilities they were purchasing the right to the future profits 
of a company that, with some probability, would be regulated with a regime that was a mix of 
rate of return and price cap. The theory implies that the market risk would be a mix of the 
market risk of rate of return and of price cap, hence lower than the market risk before and after 
the period of policy uncertainty. The evidence shows that this is the case. Had the existing 
regulation model been a rate of return model and had the proposal under consideration been a 
move to the price cap model, then one would anticipate, from this evidence, that the market 
risk of utilities would have risen. The central point suggested by the evidence here, and in the 
examples using more recent policy changes which are analysed below, is that any increase 
 
8 There have been suggestions that the impact is related purely to the water industry but Figure 1 shows quite 
clearly that this is not the case.  
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would be attributable to the underlying economic theory not the political and regulatory 
uncertainty.   
Also, the theory would indicate that if a windfall tax is seen as a one-off shock, then it 
would have no or limited impact on the market risk. If it was seen as something that could arise 
again in the future but with very low probability (and could possibly work in both directions, 
as the treatment of banks in abnormal crisis circumstances might suggest), then again this 
would have no or limited effect. Thus, the failure to find any impact of the windfall tax on the 
market risk of the utilities is again quite consistent with economic theory.  
This research suggests that the implementation of, and uncertainty and ‘political’ 
discussion around, policies such as more explicit sharing (Ross9), utility companies explicitly 
putting more emphasis on the their public interest in their day to day decisions (Helm10), greater 
use of conditional review clauses or more generally there being more of a social contract 
between utility companies and their customers (including perhaps greater emphasis on helping 
vulnerable customers (National Audit Office (2019), awareness of ESG, and such like) will not 
necessarily increase the market risk of these companies. Indeed, it is perfectly possible for it to 
reduce the market risk.11 Assuming such changes do not lead to a major decrease in the utilities’ 
relative debt-equity ratios, then we can be confident that this would not increase the relative 
cost of capital but reduce it.  
There is an additional feature of the empirical evidence that is relevant. The period 
covered included the so called ‘dotcom bubble’ and the early collapse of it. This is the reason 
that the control sample was chosen to be an ‘old economy’ sample (hence a better sample to 
compare the UK utilities with during the dotcom bubble, albeit with the probable exception of 
BT, as opposed to a random sample of UK companies). Figure 1 documents a dramatic fall in 
the market risk of the utility sample and the old economy sample in this period. It appears to 
affect both samples in a similar way.  Grout and Zalewska (2006) show that this effect is exactly 
replicated by analogous utility and ‘old economy’ samples in the US. This is a good example 
of a general point, namely that factors external to the sector are likely to have more impact on 
the market risk of utilities than any change or potential change in regulation.  
 
 
 
9 https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CCWater-Customer-Matters-speech-  
10 http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/assets/secure/documents/RIP-RPI-X-regulation-OFWAT-and-OFGEM-nail-
down-the-coffin-17.04.18.pdf 
11 ESG is the acronym for ‘Environmental, Social and Governance’. 
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4.2.2 Energy transmission companies and water companies since 2005. 
The biggest single change in utility regulation in the last decade has probably been the 
introduction of the RIIO model for energy networks. Here, we use techniques similar to those 
described in the section above to see whether there is any apparent relationship between the 
market risk of regulated energy network companies (referred to as the energy companies 
hereafter) quoted on the LSE (National Grid and SSE) and the introduction of the RIIO model, 
using daily data from January 2005 to July 2019. Figure 2 plots the Kalman Filter estimates of 
daily betas (i.e. market risk) over this period for the energy companies, the UK regulated water 
companies quoted on the LSE and the difference between these two.   
Figure 2 shows 5 key dates in the RIIO process, from the decision by Ofgem in March 
2008 to review the traditional RPI-X (i.e. price cap) model to the sector specific consultation 
for RIIO 2 in December 2018. Although the market risk of both the energy companies and of 
the water companies have moved around during this period there is little association between 
the development of the RIIO model and changes in the market risk of the energy companies, 
and no evidence that the current level of the market risk of the energy companies is higher than 
it was before the financial crisis.  
Even more interesting is to look at the Kalman Filter estimates of the difference 
between the market risk of the energy companies and the market risk of the water companies. 
The difference in the market risk between the two sectors is quite stable. Indeed, investigation 
of the confidence intervals, not shown on the figure, indicates that the difference between the 
energy and the water companies shown in Figure 2 is not statistically significantly different 
from a constant difference throughout the period.  
The empirical evidence shows that the changes we observe in market risk are common 
to both sectors, i.e. the market risk may have changed but the difference between them is not 
statistically significantly different from a constant value. The implication being that changes 
are not related to any changes in regulation in one sector that is not present in the other, or to 
put in another way, the uncertainty surrounding the assessment of the tradition price cap and 
the consequent introduction of the RIIO model does not appear to have had a significant impact 
on the market risk of the energy companies.  Similarly, there is no evidence that the debt-equity 
ratio of the portfolio of the energy companies decreased relative to the water companies during 
the development and introduction of the RIIO process (indeed, it appears to have increased), 
so there is no evidence that the regulatory change increased the relative cost of capital.  
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Figure 2. 
Kalman Filter estimated time-paths of daily betas (market risk) for the portfolios of the water companies (brown, 
dotted line), of the energy companies (dark blue, continuous line), and the difference between them (grey, thin, 
continuous line) for the period 01 January 2005 – 31 July 2019. The vertical lines ((a)- (e)) mark regulator events 
as discussed in the main text. 
 
(a) Announcement of the RPI-X@20 Review 
(b) RPI-X@20 Decision Document 
(c) Decision Strategy Document for RIIO-T1 
(d) RIIO-T1 Final Proposals 
(e) RIIO-T2 Sector Specific Consultation  
 
 
 4.2.3 Centrica and the introduction of the Default Tariff Cap for the electricity and gas 
supply market 
Another recent period of regulatory uncertainty and consequent change in utility 
regulation arose in the electricity and gas supply market where a default tariff cap was 
implemented in January 2019. In this subsection we consider the market risk of Centrica, one 
of the leading gas and electricity suppliers, and the difference between the market risk of 
Centrica and the market risk of the water and energy companies.  
Centrica has been the centre of considerable disruption in last decade. Iain Conn, the 
chief executive, has said that in recent years the group faced a “huge number of headwinds”. 
These and other changes have included the recent default tariff cap in the UK, problems with 
the US supply business, reduced gasfield production, working towards shifting the company to 
one in tune with a lower carbon economy, several of its nuclear power plants being offline, and 
launching a partnership with Ford (the carmaker). The share price has fallen relatively 
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consistently from over 400p in 2013 to 65p in early August 2019. Recently, following a halving 
of its share price in the last five months, Mr Conn indicated that he will resign from his position 
as CEO.  
Since the disruption has, to a significant degree, been company specific we cannot 
expect the approach of focusing on relative differences to isolate the questions we are interested 
in and this needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the evidence. However, despite these 
problems there are some cautious conclusions that can be drawn.  
The Kalman filter results for the market risk of Centrica and the difference between the 
market risk of Centrica and the market risk of the portfolio of water and energy companies used 
in the previous subsection (referred to here as ‘utility companies’) are shown in Figure 3(a) for 
the period 1 January 2005 - 31 July 2019.  This clearly indicates that there is considerable 
volatility in the market risk of Centrica over time and that some of this translates into changes 
in the relative market risk. This is consistent with the suggestion that there are significant 
changes happening to Centrica over this period that are not reflected in the utility companies.  
 
 
Figure 3(a). 
Kalman Filter estimated time-paths of daily betas (market risk) for Centrica (dark blue, continuous line), and the 
difference between Centrica and the portfolio of the utility companies (red, dashed line) for the period 01 January 
2005 – 31 July 2019.  
 
 
 
However, if we focus on a period covering the six months running up to the 
announcement by the Prime Minister that there would be a Default Tariff Cap retail until just 
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after the first cap was implemented, then we may be able to focus on the main announcements 
of regulatory changes and their implementation whilst hopefully limiting the possibility of 
impact of  non-regulatory Centrica events impacting on the data.  The results for the market 
risk of Centrica and the difference between the market risk of Centrica and the market risk of 
the portfolio of utility companies are shown in Figure 3(b) for the period 1 April 2017 to 31 
January 2019. The figure also shows three key dates. The first relates to when the Prime 
Minister announced that there would be a price cap. The second is when Ofgem published its 
proposals on the methodology, and the third relates to when the specific price cap levels for 
the initial cap were announced. The cap came into force on 1 January 2019, a month before the 
end of the data in Figure 3(b).  
 
 
Figure 3(b) 
Kalman Filter estimated time-paths of daily betas (market risk) for Centrica (dark blue, continuous line), and the 
difference between Centrica and the portfolio of the utility companies (red, dashed line) for the period 01 April 
2017 – 31 July 2019. The vertical lines ((a)- (c)) mark regulator events as discussed in the main text. 
 
(a) Prime Minister announces there will be a Default Tariff Cap (DTC) 
(b) Proposals on the DCT methodology published 
(c) Price levels of initial DTC announced 
 
 
The line denoting the market risk of Centrica and the line denoting the difference 
between the market risk of Centrica and the market risk of the water and utility companies are 
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relatively stable in this period. Indeed, the line showing the difference between the market risk 
of Centrica and the market risk of the utility companies is not statistically significantly different 
from a constant value throughout the period. It is difficult to say anything too definitive because 
of all the changes that have impacted on Centrica in the last decade and the short period we are 
investigating (making it difficult to collect detailed evidence of debt equity changes for the 
short period). However, the evidence appears to suggest that the period of uncertainty with 
regard to whether there would be a default cap or not, the uncertainty with regard to the form 
that it would take, and what the level would be when it was introduced, had no significant effect 
on the relative market risk of Centrica.     
 
4.2.4 The market risk of utility stocks following the financial crisis.  
Another example of utility wide effects on market risk has arisen in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. This is particularly interesting in the context of this note because it relates 
to what appear, with the benefit of hindsight, to be ‘errors’ made in the setting of the price caps 
following the financial crisis. There are many complex effects that may impinge on the market 
risk of companies since the financial crisis but there are two that are potentially particularly 
relevant for utility companies, notably in the UK. One is the impact on the relative market risk 
of sectors because of the post-crisis comparative demise of the banking sector, and the other is 
the relative attractiveness of utility stocks as a result of the ensuing monetary response pursued 
by governments. Grout and Zalewska (2016) analyse these effects in the 13 G12 countries in 
the post-crisis period.  
The first effect has a simple intuition. The weighted average of the market risk of all 
the companies on a market is, by assumption in the CAPM theory, equal to one. If one sector, 
in this case banking, declines significantly as a fraction of the market (due to share price falls, 
large players leaving the market, etc.), then, other things being equal, for purely mathematical 
reasons the other betas of the companies have to change to keep the weighted average at one. 
The only exception to this is if, by a ‘statistical quirk’, the beta of the banking sector happened 
to be one in which case there is no readjustment needed on other betas to keep the weighted 
average at one.  If the banking sector’s market risk was above average (i.e. its market risk was 
greater than one) the decline in the relative size of the banking sector in a market would increase 
the market risk of other stocks. Conversely, if the banking sector’s market risk was below 
average (i.e. its market risk less than one) the decline in the relative size of the banking sector 
in a market would decrease the market risk of other stocks.  
 21 
 
To investigate this effect Grout and Zalewska (2016) looked at the change in the market 
risk of the industrial sector in each of the 13 G12 countries and related this to the market risk 
of the banking sector in that country immediately before the financial crisis. The results are in 
Figure 4 below. Obviously, there will be many other effects of the crisis across countries but if 
this particular effect were the sole effect, then one should find that an increase in the market 
risk of the industrials sector arises where the market risk of the banking sector was above one 
and a fall in the market risk of the industrials sector where the market risk of the banking sector 
was below one.  In terms of Figure 4, countries would have to lie in either the right hand upper 
quadrant identified by the two thick lines (i.e. the market risk of the banking sector higher than 
the average market risk was associated with an increase in the market risk of the industrial s 
sector) or the lower left hand quadrant (i.e. the market risk of the banking sector lower than the 
average market risk was associated with a decline in the market risk of the industrials sector).  
Figure 4 shows that all countries, save Sweden, sit in these two quadrants (Sweden is 
frequently seen as an exceptional case in the context of banking because of its response to the 
dramatic collapse of the Swedish banking in the eighties).  Note, the Netherlands display a 
significantly greater increase than all other countries which helps reinforce the underlying 
argument given that in the Netherlands the post-crisis market capitalisation of the banking 
sector was only 3.9% of the pre-crisis figure.  
 
 
Figure 4. 
The pre-crisis market risk of the banking sector versus the change in the market risk 
of the industrials sector for the 13 G12 countries. 
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The second effect we note above concerns the interaction of the monetary policy post-
crisis with the market risk of utilities. On one hand, there is the perception that post crisis it 
would be harder to fund infrastructure investments than pre-crisis but, on the other hand, the 
Policy (Central Bank) Rate for most countries was exceeding low. For example, in the case of 
the UK, Bank Rate was 0.5% or below between March 2009 and August 2018. Money seeking 
high returns but low risk was attracted to utilities and related infrastructure investments (see 
Grout and Zalewska (2016) for a discussion of this process including Berkshire-Hathaway’s 
changing view of infrastructure investment). Far from finding it difficult to fund infrastructure 
projects, utilities were considered one of the few favourable and safe investments. This 
provided an offsetting force to the underlying direction of travel that we have identified in 
market risk of the industrials sector.  
 
 
Figure 5. 
The pre-crisis market risk of the banking sector versus the change in the market risk 
of the utility sector for 11 G12 countries. 
 
 
The net effect on utilities is shown in Figure 5, which repeats the exercise shown in 
Figure 4 but now for the change in the market risk for the utility index in each country. On 
average, the market risk has not risen for utilities as much as for industrials. The average 
increase in the market risk for industrials was 0.18 compared to an increase of 0.03 for utilities. 
In the case of the UK the market risk of the industrials sector rose by 0.2 whereas the market 
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risk for the utility sector fell by 0.03. Post the financial crisis, debt-equity ratios of utilities have 
not fallen relative to industrial companies and hence the decline in the relative market risk of 
utilities carries over to a relative decline in the cost of capital.  
Thus, the concern that was often present in the discussion around utility markets post-
financial crisis, namely, that the crisis may negatively impacted on the ability to fund the major 
investment programmes going forward, did not materialise. Indeed, utilities have been 
favoured by a ‘halo effect’ in the absence of alternative low risk investments. Obviously, the 
crisis has had many complex effects but the effects we identify here are material. This 
difference between expectation and experience is manifest in the RIIO-1 price controls which 
used a market risk of 0.9-0.95 in the RIIO-GD1 and RIIO-T1 price controls despite consultants’ 
reports indicating the number was lower at that time.  
 
 
5 Closing comments 
 
5.1 Importance of principles and direction of travel  
The case studies provide a general picture. There is no evidence that the changes (or 
possible changes) in regulation or the introduction of regulation increased the relative market 
risk of the companies that were directly affected by the changes. Where we have sufficiently 
long samples to analyse, there also appears to be no evidence of the change in regulations 
increasing the cost of capital.  
This may appear to be a dramatic result but there are common features of the changes 
that we consider, which provide a clue as to why this is the case. The evidence is suggestive 
that the direction of travel, i.e. some degree of predictability in how regulators may respond 
when changing policy, is likely to be important. For example, companies were aware that New 
Labour were likely to move towards sharing and an extreme version of this, the windfall tax, 
which clawed back a slug of what they saw as undue profitability. Similarly, concerns over the 
competitiveness of the retail energy market, the functioning of the market and levels of 
customer service had existed for many years and were intensifying. So, even before price 
regulation of the variable retail energy tariffs was a genuine possibility the direction of travel 
of any potential regulation was relatively apparent.   
Although there was uncertainty around the specific changes in regulation in the case-
studies we consider, the direction of ‘regulatory’ travel was clear, i.e. the precise form of the 
regulation was not obvious, but where it was heading was. This makes it easier for companies 
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to plan and may well be an important factor in mitigating against increases in the market risk 
arising from the changes.  
The implication is that it is important for regulators to adhere to longer-lived specific 
principles. If regulators have specific principles which give firms confidence in judging how a 
regulator is likely to respond to unforeseen events, adaptive regulation can bring benefits 
without bringing costs. 
 
5.2 The consumer and utility company risk balance. 
During a price control period it is standard for regulated prices of the relevant utility to 
be indexed to inflation. The simple argument being that the general price level and wages tend 
to follow a roughly similar pattern. Hence, increasing prices to reflect changes in the RPI, or 
more commonly now CPI, keeps the real price that the consumer pays constant and does not 
reflect a change in the consumers welfare. Thus, indexing prices does not reflect an increase in 
risk for the consumer, indeed, not indexing output prices to retail prices would probably lead 
to an increase in risk for the consumer. A difficulty arises, however, when the cost of some of 
the utility’s inputs are not anticipated to move in a similar manner to the general price level 
and are material to the costs of delivery. These are called real price effects. If there is 
uncertainty as to how the price of these specific inputs will change in the future, there is a 
question as to who bears any associated risk.  
One solution is for the regulator to estimate the expected deviation in the price of the 
input from the general price level and set prices to reflect this estimate. Deviations from the 
expected change either provide an unexpected loss or benefit to the utility and the utility 
shareholders bear this risk. At the other extreme the price of this input could be indexed as time 
passes, just like all other prices, and the price the consumer pays changes as the input price 
changes. This limits any abnormal return arising from real price effects but (real) consumer 
prices then rise or fall as the input price changes.  
Estimating real price effects of this type for price controls can be the source of 
significant outperformance. For example, Cambridge Economic Policy Associates (2018) 
estimated that not indexing real price effects in RIIO increased the outperformance by 0.8% in 
RIIO-ET1 (i.e. Electricity Transmission), 0.4% in RIIO-GT1 (i.e. Gas Transmission) and 0.7% 
in RIIO-GD1 (i.e. Gas Distribution Networks).   
Regulators are less likely to estimate real price effects than in the past in a desire to 
avoid excess performance. However, it is important to recognise that one should not simply 
view a failure to index real price changes, which subsequently led to ‘excess’ returns, as a clear 
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error. There is a genuine debate around who should bear the risk. Things have moved over the 
years from a position where it was usually assumed that companies should bear the risk and as 
a result real price effects should be estimated in advance to one where any failure to index is 
automatically deemed to be an error by the regulator, hence indexing is now becoming 
standard. Whether consumers have gained as a result of this change is nuanced question that 
has not been addressed.   
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